19세기 초 튀니지와 조선

동아시아 근대사에 대해 찾아본 김에 오랫만에 튀니지 역사를 다시 살펴보았다. 19세기 이후는 그간 별로 관심이 없던 시대라 제쳐놓고 있었는데, 다시 읽어보니 조선의 식민지화 과정과 너무나 유사한 것이 아닌가?!
조선은 청나라의 조공국으로서 한편으로는 조선에 대한 통제를 강화하려는 청나라로부터 독립해야 하는 동시에, 조선을 식민지화하려는 일본을 저지해야 했으며, 그 와중에 고질적인 가난과 부패를 해소하고 외국의 자본과 기술, 인력을 빌어 근대화와 부국강병을 추진하는 아주 어려운 과업을 이뤄내야 했다.
튀니지 역시 형식상 오스만 투르크의 속령으로서 한편으로는 오스만 중앙정부로부터의 독립을 추구하면서도 다른 한편으로는 프랑스를 비롯한 유럽 세력의 간섭에 저항해야 했으며, 만성적인 재정 적자에도 불구하고 동시에 유럽의 자본과 인력, 기술에 의존해 후진적인 경제를 발전시키고 개혁을 이뤄나가려 했으나 도리어 유럽 자본에 종속되는 결과를 낳았다.

The French Invasion of Algeria and Its Impact

(...) The French conquest was made easier not only due to the hostility that the bey and his ministers harboured towards Algeria, whose incursions into Tunisia’s territory left a deep mark on the collective memory of the Tunisian people, but also due to the bey’s Francophone proclivity. (...) The bey’s desire to assert his independence vis-à-vis the Porte undoubtedly contributed to the pro-French stand that he adopted on the eve of Algeria’s conquest. (...) There was another reason why the bey’s relations with France improved significantly at that crucial moment; in October 1829 the French consul, Mathieu de Lesseps, brought to the bey’s attention a Janissary conspiracy to overthrow him. This left no doubt in the bey’s mind that France was his only reliable ally.
(...)
In July 1830, the French prime minister Jules de Polignac submitted to the bey a treaty providing the European powers with new commercial guarantees. The treaty provided for the emancipation of all Christian slaves, protection of all naval facilities and the elimination of all dues paid by the European powers. In addition, the European powers were granted freedom of commerce at the Regency as well as a ‘most favoured nation’ status. The coral-fishing privileges that France had enjoyed until 1799 were restored for an annual payment of 13,400 piasters to the treasury and the bey agreed to stop the illegal shipments of explosives from Tabarka to Constantine. Furthermore, he allowed the French to use all the facilities at the Regency and promised to suppress the anti-French sentiment in the country. And, finally, a secret clause gave France permission to build a chapel in Carthage in honour of King Saint Louis, who died during his crusade to Tunisia in 1270. The only item on which Hussein Bey had reservations was the issue of coral fishing so, on 8 August 1830, he signed the treaty.
[주: 조일수호조규를 떠올리게 하는 대목이다. 그것보다는 훨씬 불평등한 조약이었지만, 근세 이슬람 국가가 유럽 국가와 맺던 다른 조약에 비하면 그렇게 가혹한 편은 아니다. 해적도 나폴레옹의 몰락 이후로는 사양산업이 된 지 오래였고, 유럽인의 상업적 침투를 허용한 건 국민경제의 개념이 없었던(Islahi, A. A., History of Islamic Economic Thought, 2014) 이슬람 위정자에겐 특별히 거부감이 드는 것도 아니었다. 마찬가지로, 강화도 조약 역시 당시 조선 조정은 그 내용에 별다른 불만을 표시하지 않았다.]
Feeling secure in his position as a sovereign capable of asserting his independence from his Ottoman overlord Hussein Bey appeared content with his Francophile policy and nothing seemed to indicate that the security of the Regency was compromised. Moreover, he was encouraged by the attitude of the French agents. General Bertrand Clauzel, who led the Algerian campaign, nominated Hussein’s brother, Sidi Mustafa, and his nephew, Sidi Ahmad, as beys of Constantine and Oran respectively, with the right to control all the revenues of these provinces in return for a payment of 1 million francs. (...) Thus, the French position in Tunisia became overwhelmingly strong despite the concessions made to Britain and Italy.
The main objective of Tunisia’s foreign policy during the years covered in this chapter was to avoid French domination. Inspired by the Ottoman reform movement (tanzimat) and the aggressive policy pursued by Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha of Egypt the beys of Tunis believed that modernization and the introduction of Western technology would strengthen their position vis-à-vis the European powers and prevent foreign domination. There were many difficulties, however, that stood in the way of reform. The chronic deficit in the beylical budget and constant interference by the European powers were obstacles too difficult to surmount. Consequently, the reforms introduced were neither thorough nor realistic. In fact, the attempts to introduce reforms actually facilitated foreign domination. With the exception of Great Britain, the European powers remained indifferent or refrained from supporting the Tunisian reform movement, and while the Ottoman sultan regarded the tanzimat as part of an overall attempt to reassert his control over the Regency he was apprehensive that such reforms would encourage the beys of Tunis to resist Ottoman domination. France had similar apprehensions and therefore the policy pursued by its agents in Tunis was inconsistent and often discouraging. The weakness of the Tunisian government characterized by chronic budget deficits, corruption and inefficiency led to greater reliance on foreign powers, with their capital and technicians, and left the government incapable of resisting foreign domination. The European powers justified their intervention in the Regency’s affairs, arguing that they came to recover their loans. The efforts to collect unpaid loans culminated in a French initiative, taken in 1869, to form an international debt commission, leaving little choice to the bey but to maintain closer contact with the Porte after a long period of struggle to assert the Regency’s independence. The two main foreign policy objectives pursued by the early Husseini sovereigns – to assert their independence vis-à-vis the Porte and to contain Algeria – gave way to a new challenge: to avoid French occupation. The new challenge required that the bey put the plan to neutralize Ottoman influence on the backburner. As it turned out, however, the bey’s options were limited and the Regency fell victim to profound changes that took place in Europe during the second half of the nineteenth century. Imbued with intense national sentiment and invigorated by industrial strength, France was ready to enter the imperialist contest, which brought Tunisia under its occupation.
(...)
The poor state of the economy and stiff competition from European dealers and merchants made it necessary to devalue the Tunisian coinage. Despite such economic difficulties, the bey had to continue acting as a loyal vassal of his Ottoman overlord. This loyalty manifested itself not only in the customary symbolical acts, which the bey had to perform in order to demonstrate his loyalty to the sultan, but also in allowing the sultan to tap the Regency’s resources and even to use Tunisian troops in his military campaigns. (...)
While the Regency’s financial problems mounted, the expenses of the bey’s court increased. By 1829, the finance minister, Hussein Bash Mamlūk, was said to have been responsible for a deficit amounting to 2 million piasters. This was also a year of drought, which compounded the difficulties, and the Regency had to resort to importing grain. In addition, corruption and inefficient fiscal practices weakened the Regency. The suspicion that the finance minister was responsible for the deficit led to his dismissal and replacement by Shakir Sāheb Tabā’a. Such were the conditions when the French forces occupied Algeria in the following year. Even if the bey contemplated acting against the invading French forces, which is in itself doubtful, there was little he could do, especially in light of the unequivocal warning from the French government that any intervention would be considered a casus belli. (...)
[주: 이 또한 근대화 정책을 추진할 재원이 절망적으로 모자랐던 조선/대한제국의 상황과도 일치한다.]
It was in a state of utter weakness that the bey accepted a new treaty with France in August 1830, obliging him to maintain freedom of trade and abolish slavery. At the same time, the French demanded and obtained military support from the Regency. They embarked on military training for young Tunisians with a view to forming a regular military corps. The practice of providing the Regency with military assistance, initiated by France, intensified under Hussein’s successors.
[주: 양쪽한테 동시에 삥뜯김 ㅠ]

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